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Abstract:  For several decades, economists have been concerned with the problem of optimal resource use 
under uncertainty.  In many studies, researchers assume that prices evolve according to an exogenous 
stochastic process and solve the corresponding dynamic optimization problem to yield an optimal decision 
rule for exploitation of the resource.  This study is motivated by our attempt to understand the relationship 
between efficiency in resource markets and optimal harvest decisions in which price is an exogenous state 
variable.  The literature on optimal commodity storage finds that in a rational expectations equilibrium 
commodity prices are stationary and serially correlated.  Yet recent papers on optimal timber harvesting 
that assume exogenous stationary prices generate harvest rules inconsistent with the price processes on 
which they are based.   
In this study, we investigate the appropriate form of the stochastic process governing prices of 
renewable resources.  We develop a model in which timber is supplied by profit-maximizing managers 
with rational expectations and aggregate timber demand is subject to independent exogenous shocks.  In 
contrast to earlier studies, prices are endogenously determined.  Managers know the structure of the timber 
market and form expectations of future market equilibria in making optimal harvesting decisions.  We 
show under general conditions that efficient timber prices are stationary and serially correlated.  
Stationarity and serial correlation are shown to arise from two sources:  the occurrence of stock-outs (i.e., 
depletion of the inventory) and stock-dependent growth of the resource.  Further, we show that prices retain 
these properties even in the absence of stock-outs.  Simulations are used to further illustrate the analytical 
results. 
  Our findings have implications for a large number of economic analyses of optimal resource use.  
First, our results reveal why extraction rules for renewable resources based on exogenous price 
specifications are internally inconsistent, even when the specification conforms to the stochastic behavior 
of prices generated by an efficient market.  These prices arise in a particular structural environment, and if 
large numbers of resource managers adopt the harvesting rule, the underlying structural environment would 
change, and the price process would deviate from that used to derive the harvesting rule.  Second, we show 
that there can be no gains from exploiting the stochasticity of resource prices in a rational expectations 
world, a finding that challenges the prescriptive policies for resource use found in many studies, including 
those on option values.   Third, our results show that time-series analyses designed to test for the efficiency 
of renewable resource markets cannot distinguish prices generated in an efficient market from those 
generated in an inefficient market.  Finally, we extend the literature on optimal storage.  Previous models of 
commodity storage models are shown to be a special case of our model involving age-independent 
depreciation of the inventory. 
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Internal Consistency in Models of Optimal Resource Use Under Uncertainty 
 
 “That’s the news from Lake Wobegon, where all the women are strong, all the men are 
good looking, and all the children are above average.” – Garrison Keiller. 
 
I.  Introduction 
For several decades, economists have been concerned with the problem of optimal 
resource use under uncertainty.  Studies of nonrenewable resources have explored the 
implications of stochastic demand (Dasgupta and Heal, 1974; Pindyck, 1980) and 
reserves (Pindyck, 1980; Swierzbinski and Mendelsohn, 1989) and analyses of renewable 
resources have considered stochastic growth rates of resource stocks (Pindyck, 1984; 
Morck et al., 1989; Clarke and Reed, 1989).  A number of studies treat resource prices 
(or net benefits) as uncertain, and assume that prices evolve according to an exogenous 
stochastic process (Arrow and Fisher, 1974; Norstrom, 1975; Brennan and Schwartz, 
1985; Brazee and Mendelsohn, 1988; Reed, 1993).
1  The corresponding dynamic 
optimization problem is solved to yield an optimal decision rule for exploitation of the 
resource.  In many of these studies, authors derive an expression for the option value 
associated with exploiting the resource today and foregoing the opportunity to use 
forthcoming information on resource prices. 
  In this paper, we investigate the appropriate form of the stochastic process 
governing prices for renewable resources.  The study is motivated by our attempt to 
understand the relationship between efficiency in resource markets and optimal harvest 
decisions in which price is an exogenous state variable.  The literature on optimal 
                                                            
1 Additional references include Fisher and Hanemann (1986), Morck et al. (1989), Clarke and Reed (1989), 
Haight and Holmes (1991), Zinkham (1991), Lohmander (1992), Thomson (1992), Albers (1996), and   3 
commodity storage finds, in both stylized analytical models and empirical investigations, 
that in a rational expectations equilibrium commodity prices are stationary and serially 
correlated (Williams and Wright, 1991; Deaton and Laroque, 1992, 1996).  Yet recent 
papers on optimal timber harvesting that assume exogenous stationary prices generate 
harvest rules inconsistent with the price processes on which they are based (e.g., Brazee 
and Mendelsohn, 1988; Haight and Holmes, 1991; Plantinga, 1998).  These studies 
assume prices evolve according to a stationary stochastic process and find that, on 
average, timber managers can improve upon a fixed-length Faustmann rotation by timing 
harvests to take advantage of high prices—that is, prices above the mean of the price 
distribution.  But, just as every kid in Lake Wobegon cannot be above average (by local 
standards), not all timber managers can harvest at prices above the mean, on average.  In 
the limit, the mean of observed prices—those at which timber sales are consummated—
must equal the mean of the price distribution and, therefore, the price process fails the 
test of internal consistency.   
  A casual explanation of this result is that the authors chose badly when specifying 
the price process.  For instance, there might exist autoregressive price processes for 
which the optimal harvest rule is not characterized by the principle to cut only when the 
observed price is above its long-run mean, and these are the processes generated by an 
efficient market.  However, if an optimal harvest rule is to reproduce the mean of the 
process, then it does no better on average than a myopic rule involving fixed-length 
rotations computed at the mean price (i.e., the Faustmann rotation).  This implies that 
stochastic price variations provide no useful information to the resource manager making 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Plantinga (1998), and Clarke and Reed (1990) provide a survey of applications to natural resource 
problems.  In Pindyck (1980, 1984), prices are uncertain, but are determined endogenously.   4 
an irreversible harvesting decision, which contradicts the central result of real options 
theory (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).  Two related questions follow.  Are markets for 
renewable resources somehow fundamentally different than other commodity markets, in 
the sense that, necessarily, resource prices are non-stationary and serially independent?  
And, if not—if, in fact, renewable resource prices can be stationary and serially 
correlated—how does one interpret the recent literature on optimal timber harvesting? 
  An answer to the first question is suggested by Washburn and Binkley (1990).  In 
an analysis of stumpage markets in the U.S. South, the authors adapt a commodity 
storage model to timber.  They assume that the store of timber is not exhausted, in which 
case there is full market adjustment in each period and prices follow a martingale process 
(Hultkrantz, 1993).  In the commodity storage context, this is equivalent to there being no 
occurrence of stock-outs (i.e., depletion of the inventory).  Stock-outs drive the result that 
commodity prices are stationary and serially correlated (Williams and Wright, 1991).  
Thus, if inexhaustibility of the current inventory is a reasonable assumption for 
renewable resources
2, we might conclude that there is a fundamental difference between 
commodity and renewable resource markets and that this difference gives rise to non-
stationary and serially independent resource prices.  This explanation has some appeal 
since it appears to reconcile the issues of price behavior and market efficiency.  If 
markets are efficient, current prices should embody all relevant information contained in 
the past sequence of prices and evolve according to a martingale process.  This is the 
justification given by some authors for specifying random walk prices (e.g., Paddock et 
al., 1988; Thomson, 1992).   5 
  Martingale prices have not been formally supported by a model that captures 
realistic features of renewable resources.  In keeping with the commodity storage 
literature, which usually assumes a constant, often zero, rate of spoilage, Washburn and 
Binkley (1990) assume a constant growth rate for timber, thus eliminating a defining 
characteristic of renewable resources—growth depends on the state of the resource stock.  
In this study, we show that this assumption has important consequences.  We develop a 
model in which timber is supplied by profit-maximizing managers with rational 
expectations and aggregate timber demand is subject to independent exogenous shocks.  
While we focus on timber markets, our results are applicable to the broader class of 
renewable resources with age-dependent growth (e.g., fish, wildlife).  In contrast to 
earlier studies, prices are endogenously determined.  Managers know the structure of the 
timber market and form expectations of future market equilibria in making optimal 
harvesting decisions.  We show under general conditions that efficient timber prices are 
stationary and serially correlated even though demand shocks are uncorrelated and even 
when stock-outs do not occur.  Key to this result is the age-dependent growth of the 
timber inventory.  A demand shock induces a supply response that modifies the current 
timber inventory, and this affects future timber growth rates, optimal supply decisions, 
and equilibrium prices.  The persistence of demand shocks implies that prices are 
correlated over time. 
  Having answered no to the first question posed above, we must confront the 
second question:  if efficient prices are indeed stationary and serially correlated, why are 
harvesting rules based on such prices internally inconsistent?  Our modeling results 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 To be more precise, we should say that the probability of depleting the entire stock of the resource in a 
given period is very small.  If the resource were truly available in infinite quantity, its price would be   6 
reveal the source of the inconsistency.  These prices arise in a particular structural 
environment, and if large numbers of resource managers migrate to the harvesting rule, 
the underlying structural environment would change, and the endogenous price process 
would deviate from that used to derive the harvesting rule.  Further, we show that there 
can be no gains from exploiting the stochasticity of resource prices in a rational 
expectations world.  This point is quite subtle.  A timber manager, for example, would 
indeed raise the expected net present value of his timber by taking advantage of price 
correlations, if the point of comparison is a Faustmann decision rule, or a decision rule 
based on an incorrect assumption that prices follow a random walk (Plantinga, 1998).  
But the manager could not outperform a neighbor whose harvest decisions are based on a 
complete understanding of the structure of the system generating the correlated prices. 
  These results have implications for the large number of analyses (referenced 
above) that model resource prices or net benefits using an exogenous stochastic process.  
They raise the issue of whether structural characteristics of the resource and of resource 
markets lead to internal consistency problems with the assumed exogenous price 
processes.  In this case, the derived decision rules for exploitation of the resource are 
suboptimal and conclusions regarding incorporation of option values into the decision 
problem are potentially misleading.  Beyond these studies, our results show that time-
series analyses designed to test for market efficiency (e.g., Washburn and Binkley, 1990; 
Haight and Holmes, 1991; Yin and Newman, 1995) cannot distinguish prices generated 
in an efficient market from those generated in an inefficient market.  In addition, we 
extend the literature on optimal storage mentioned above.  Commodity storage models 
are shown to be a special case of our model involving age-independent depreciation of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
driven to zero since managers would always be willing to sell more when prices are positive.     7 
the inventory.  Our more general model reveals that prices can serially correlated as the 
result of stock-outs, an age-dependent inventory, or both. 
  In the next section, we study the behavior of timber prices analytically and, then 
in Section III, through the use of simulations.  In Section IV, we elaborate on the points 
made above in light of our results, and additional implications of the analysis.  A final 
section present conclusions. 
 
II.  Theoretical Development 
In this section, we present a partial equilibrium model of a competitive market for 
timber.  We derive the basic result that prices are stationary and serially correlated in a 
rational expectations equilibrium, even when stock-outs do not occur, and show formally 
the role of nonconstant timber growth in determining equilibrium prices. 
 
The Timber Manager’s Harvest Decision 
The manager of property j chooses the amount of timber to harvest, qjt,  to 
maximize discounted timber revenues, with the understanding that: (a) the stock of 
timber sjt grows over time; (b) he cannot harvest more timber than he holds in stock, and 
(c) future timber prices are stochastic, and conditional on current market state variables.  
Some timber managers may use only the current price to forecast future prices.  Others 
may understand that the current price is endogenous to the market, and thus may use 
other market state variables, such as the distribution of the aggregate timber stock across 
growth rates, to forecast future timber prices.  In the timber manager’s problem presented 
below the set of market-level state variables the timber manager uses to forecast timber   8 
price is defined generally as mt.   The particular composition of this set depends on the 
manager’s information and rationality. 
Let xjt denote the difference between stock and harvest at time t,   jt jt jt xsq =− . 
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where  E[] ⋅  is the expectation with respect to information available in period t; β is the 
discount factor;  () g ⋅  is an increasing, concave growth function specific to manager j; and 
(3) denotes the family of transition probabilities over the market state space M.
3  
Transition probabilities indicate the probability of moving into any feasible market state, 
conditional on the market state at time t, mt.  These probabilities reflect the timber 
manager’s information and beliefs about the market forces generating timber prices and, 
hence, are manager-specific.  So, for instance, if a manager believes that timber prices 
evolve according to a traditional first-order autoregressive process with normal iid 
                                                            
3 Note that we do not include a non-negativity constraint on  jt q ; we assume  0 jt q > .  Excluding the option 
for the manager to harvest no timber does not affect the basic nature of our results and allows us to focus 
our attention on the effect of the stock level on prices.   9 
innovations, then the state space M is the set of all feasible prices,  tt mp = , and the 
relevant parameters governing transition probabilities are the coefficients of the 
autoregressive process and the variance of the innovations.  Other specifications are 
possible, of course, and in particular, for a timber manager who treats the price of timber 
as endogenously determined by market forces, transition probabilities do not depend on 
price.  This point is revisited at the end of this section.  
Two aspects of this specification of the timber manager’s problem deserve 
emphasis.  First, the state of forest property j is described by a single state variable s.  In 
reality, this is typically not possible.  Instead, the growth in the timber stock depends on 
the distribution of the stock across age classes.  Here we simplify matters without 
affecting the points to be made in the paper.  Second, market transition probabilities are 
not conditional on the timber manager’s decision, because the manager understands the 
atomistic form of the market, and thus is a price-taker. 
 
Efficient Market Equilibrium with Independent Demand Shocks 
Because all benefits and costs of timber harvesting are private, a competitive 
market with fully-informed timber managers will maximize the expected discounted 
surplus, in which case the market equilibrium can be found from a social planner’s 
problem (the Invisible Hand as planner).  In light of the development above, it is clear 
that the planner must choose the amount of timber to cut from each of the J timber 
properties, as this determines the evolution of the stock on each property, which in turn 
determines the growth of the aggregate stock.     10 
Define  tj t
J
qq = ∑ ,   () 1 ,... tt J t qq = q , and  () 1 ,... tt J t ss = s .  Also, let  ( , ) tt pqε  
denote the inverse demand function, where  t ε  is a demand shock drawn from an iid 
distribution, and let  ( , ) tt v ε s  denote the aggregate value of forestland, given optimal 
harvesting decisions are made in the current and all future periods.  The planner chooses 
qt to solve  
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subject to (2) and (3) for all j=1,…J.  Under mild regularity conditions, the value function 
in (4) is stationary, as indicated by the lack of time subscripts.  This follows from the 
stationarity of demand, the growth function g, and the discount factor β (Rust, Theorem 
2.3, part 1). 
Let  jt γ  denote the Lagrange multiplier on the inequality constraint in (2).  For all 
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where the time subscript on the value function indicates the function is evaluated at the 
argument values in the indexed period.  The Lagrange multiplier  jt γ  has an important 
economic interpretation.  It is the net value of harvesting the last unit of stock j in the 
current period, rather than leaving it for the future.  As long as the carryover on property j   11 
is positive, this value is zero; the stock is allocated over time so that the value of the last 
unit harvested in the current period is equal to its discounted value in the future.  A stock-
out occurs when  jt γ  is strictly positive for all J properties. 
The solution to (4) gives the equilibrium harvest quantity  ( , )
ee
tt t qq ε = s , which is 
stationary under the same conditions ensuring the stationarity of the value function (Rust, 
Theorem 2.3, part 2).  Substitute the equilibrium harvest quantity into (4) and take the 
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Our purpose is to derive the equilibrium relationships between current and future prices, 
analogous to the arbitrage relationships for prices in the commodity storage literature 
(e.g., Equation 1 in Deaton and Laroque, 1992).  To this end, we begin by evaluating (6) 
in the cases of positive and zero carry-over of the stock (i.e.,  0 jt x >  and  0 jt x = , 
respectively).  
When some, but not all, timber is cut from property j, the Lagrange multiplier  jt γ  
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and so (6) reduces to 
   12 













which indicates that the value of one more unit of stock is the current market price.  This 
relationship also holds even when all the timber is harvested from property j.  This is 
shown formally by substituting q
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where  () ,
ee
j t jtt qq ε = s  is the equilibrium quantity harvested from property j in period t.  In 
the event of a stock-out, this relationship holds only if either (a)  0 jt γ = , the degenerate 










.  Substituting this equality into (6) gives the result in (7).   
Using (7), we derive the equilibrium price relationships.  Shift (7) forward by one 
period, multiply both sides by the discount factor, and taking the expectation of the result 
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where h expresses the vector of stocks in period t+1 as conditional on previous stocks st 
and equilibrium decisions.
4  Substituting (9) into (5a) at the solution and rearranging 
gives,  
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for all j.  According to (11), prices are stationary and serially correlated.  Stationarity is 
assured by the stationarity of inverse demand and the equilibrium harvest rule  ( , )
e
tt q ε s .  
Serial correlation is established by the presence of the demand shock  t ε  in the 
equilibrium prices at time t and time t+1. Recursive substitution of the state equation into 
both sides of (10) reveals that time t and t+1 prices are functions of the sequence of 
realized demand shocks from time 0 to time t and the initial inventory  0 s . 
The stock vector st is a relevant indicator of the state of the timber market for two 
reasons.  First, it indicates physical scarcity—the potential for a stock-out.  Second, it 
indicates the rate of stock growth.  The correlation in prices is induced by the state 
                                                            
4 From (2) we have in equilibrium,  ,1 (,) ( (,) ) (,)
ee
j t jt jt t t j jt jt t t j t t ss q g s q εε ε + =− + − = ss h s ; the vector h is 
composed of the J elements hj.   14 
equation (2), and so it follows that either of these factors—physical scarcity or stock-
dependent growth rates—is a source of correlated prices.  In the traditional commodity 
storage model, in which stock growth rates are constant (usually zero), correlated prices 
arise only due to the positive probability of stock-outs.  In these models, stock-outs are 
integral to the functioning of efficient markets.  If prices are so high that the probability 
of a stock-out is zero, there is at least one unit of stock wasted, never to be used; this is 
inefficient.   
The first equation in (11) confirms that with stock-dependent growth, stock-outs 
are not necessary for correlated prices.  If there is a positive demand shock in period t, 
more stock will be harvested in period t, but at the cost of leaving to the future only 
relatively high-growth timber—timber that managers would prefer to hold rather than cut.  
This serves to raise the price of timber in period t+1 and, thus, the period t demand shock 
exhibits some degree of persistence.  Note that the conditions in (11) can simultaneously 
hold for subsets of the J properties.  Accordingly, one can think of this problem as 
involving a continuum of stock-outs, where timber managers progressively deplete low-
growth timber to high-growth timber, possibly never depleting the entire stock.     
  We now return to the problem faced by timber managers.  Expectations are 
represented by the transition probabilities in (3).  For timber managers with rational 
expectations, the preceding development makes clear that transition probabilities are 
governed by the distribution of ε , and conditional on the stock vector st.  Of course, these 
variables are interesting to managers only because they hold information about future 
prices.  The net revenue generated by a timber manager who instead conditions transition 
probabilities on the observed price of timber is necessarily lower.  In effect, such a   15 
manager is attempting to predict future prices with limited information.  Nonetheless, 
given that the only state variable used by the manager is the current price, it clearly serves 
the manager to use the information embedded in correlated prices.   
The timber manager may choose to forecast prices with limited information 
because full information is costly.  Of course, as the number of managers using limited 
information grows large, the actual behavior of timber prices deviates from that predicted 
by the model; recent literature examines the behavior of commodity markets when 
information is costly (Brock and Hommes, 1997; Chavas, 1999).  Yet the point remains 
that correlated, stationary prices may arise in efficient timber markets even in the absence 
of stock-outs.  This point is demonstrated in the simulations below.    
   
III.  A Simulation to Illustrate the Results 
In this section we illustrate using simulations that (a) when the growth of a 
renewable stock does not depend on the state of the stock, endogenous stockouts are the 
source of correlated prices, and (b) when the growth of the stock does depend on the state 
of the stock, stockouts may not arise, and yet prices are correlated due to state-dependent 
growth.   
The simulation is based on the following model of the flow of timber from forest 
land.  Just after harvesting, and in the absence of additional harvesting, timber stock 
(volume) per unit land increases for four consecutive periods across four “stock classes”, 
and then stops growing, remaining in class four.  Harvesting interrupts this growth 
process, causing the stock on the harvested land to revert to class one in the period 
following harvest.  Examining a model where timber grows for only a few periods is   16 
necessary because the state of the system is defined by the amount of timber in each stock 
class.  As the number of classes increases, the size of the numerical simulation increases 
exponentially (this is Bellman’s curse of dimensionality).  
The amount of land in timber production is fixed; the model abstracts from the 
movement of land into and out of timber production.  This being the case, three state 
variables fully define the state of the forest; namely, the amount of stock in classes 2, 3, 
and 4 (the amount of stock in class 1 can be deduced given the amount of stock in the 
other classes and the invariance of land in timber production).  Denote by  jt s , j=1,2,3,4, 
the stock in class j in period t, and denote by  jt q  the harvest in period t of stock in class j.  
Note that in this section, the subscript j refers to a stock class, rather than a property.  Let 
gj denote the additional volume per unit stock that accrues when a unit of stock grows 
from class j to class j+1:  () ( ) 1, 1 1 jt j j t j t sg s q ++ =+ − .  With stock per unit land normalized 
to one for stock in class one, and with total land in timber production also normalized to 
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and the inequality constraints, 
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These inequality constraints state that the stock in class j harvested at time t is bounded 
by zero
5 and the amount of stock actually in the class.   
For the sake of simplicity, inverse demand for timber is linear, with a simple 
additive disturbance shifting the intercept in period t: 
 
(14)  01 tt t pc c q =+ ε −⋅ .  
 
The disturbance is independently and identically distributed with open lower bound 
greater than  14 0 cs c − , assuring that timber is always scarce (positive price).   
  Because all benefits and costs are private, a competitive market with fully-
informed participants will generate as an equilibrium the solution to the problem of a 
planner maximizing surplus.  Let st denote the 3-dimensional vector of stock in classes 2 
through 4, let qt denote the 4-dimensional vector of harvest decisions, and let qt denote 
the sum of the elements of qt.  The planner’s problem can be stated,
6   
 
                                                            
5 For the simulations, we must incorporate the non-negativity constraint on qjt to ensure that none of the 
solutions involve negative harvest quantities. 
6 Although it is not immediately obvious, this model corresponds to the one investigated in the previous 
section, for the case where (a) the growth function, as defined by gj , is the same for all properties, and (b) 
properties are points on the land surface, with the harvest decision on each property reduced to the binary 
decision of either cutting the entire stock on the property, or postponing harvest.    This being the case, then 
under the assumption that all timber managers are rational, fully-informed profit maximizers, all managers 
behave the same way (employ the harvest policy favored by the surplus-maximizing planner), and so the 
relevant state variables are the total amount of stock in each class.       18 
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If at the solution the stock in class j is harvested but not completely eliminated, we have 
the first-order necessary condition, 
 



















which corresponds to (5a), and makes clear that because we are interested in the 
evolution of equilibrium prices, we are more interested in accurate estimation of the 
gradient of the value function,  () ,










, than of the value function itself.  
With this in mind, the appropriate algorithm is one in which we solve iteratively the 
necessary conditions and adjoint equations associated with (15).  
Disturbances are drawn from a discrete uniform distribution with ten values 
evenly spaced in the interval (-1,1).  The value function gradient is approximated for 
every possible value of the disturbance by a 10
th-order Chebychev polynomial in each of 
the three dimensions of the state space.
7  Details of the approximation algorithm are 
provided in the appendix.  Table 1 provides parameter values used in the analysis.         
                                                            
7 Miranda and Fackler (2001) elucidate the advantages of Chebychev polynomial approximations in 
numerical analysis.  In the simulation, higher order polynomial approximations had no discernible effect on 
results.   19 
Simulation Results 
Figure 1(a-b) presents carryover and timber price for a typical one-hundred year 
sequence, for the case where growth is constant (gj=1, j=2,3,4).  Equilibrium carryover is 
always less than 1.0 because the stock is never carried past stock class s2 (recall that total 
available forestland is normalized to unity).  As expected, stockouts (carryover =0) are 
frequent (55% of periods).  Figure 1b exhibits the behavior typical of stationary prices 
with positive correlation; prices cross the mean value (8.0) frequently, and peaks are 
greater than troughs.  Fitting the full price series (10
4 observations) to an AR(1) process, 
 
  01 1 tt t pdd p η − =+ + , 
 
yields parameter values d0=6.61 and d1=.17, with standard errors .0098  and .079, 
respectively.  The Dickey-Fuller test rejects the hypothesis of a unit root.
8  
Consider now the case where growth is nonconstant, with g1=1.2, g2=1.1, and 
g3=1.0; as a stand ages, it increases in volume at a decreasing rate.  Figure 2(a-b) presents 
carryover and timber price for a typical 100-year sequence.  As shown in Figure 2a, 
carryover never falls to zero (no stockouts), and in fact, over a sequence of 10
6 periods 
the carryover never falls to zero, suggesting that the probability of a stockout is zero.  
Nonetheless, Figure 2b clearly indicates that prices are stationary and positively 
correlated.
9   Fitting the full price series to an AR(1) process yields parameter estimates 
                                                            
8 The test statistic for H0: d0=0, d1=1 is 42.25; the critical value at the 90% confidence level is 3.78. 
9 In this case, the mean value is 7.8, and so peaks are clearly greater than troughs.  The mean value is lower 
than for the case where growth is constant (Figure 1) because the average harvest is greater: 1.10 compared 
to .94.     20 
d0=5.74 and d1=.27, with standard errors .0096 and .075, respectively.  The Dickey-Fuller 
test rejects the hypothesis of a unit root.
10     
Finally, consider the effect of the discount factor on price behavior when timber 
growth is nonconstant.  We might expect that as the discount factor β falls from .95, 
stockouts begin to arise because the future becomes increasingly unimportant to current 
decisions.  The increase in stockouts would serve to increase price correlation, but the 
increasing disengagement of current decisions from future outcomes would serve to 
reduce the price correlation; when β becomes sufficiently low, all available timber is 
harvested in the current period, in which case prices are serially uncorrelated because the 
demand shock is serially uncorrelated.  These countervailing forces could lead to 
nonlinearities in the relationship between β and d1.  By comparison, as β increases 
from .95, we might expect the correlation of prices to increase, because the effect of 
current decisions on future states becomes more significant in the decision problem, and 
stockouts occur with zero probability.  Table 2 presents selected results from a sensitivity 
analysis of β .  As expected, stockouts increase as the discount factor falls.  The 
correlation coefficient d1 behaves in a nonlinear fashion.  In all cases, nonstationarity is 
statistically rejected.   
 
IV.  Discussion 
In this section, we discuss the implications of our results for analyses of optimal 
resource use under uncertainty, time-series analyses of resource prices, and models of 
optimal storage. 
                                                            
10 The test statistic for H0: d0=0, d1=1 is 42.25; the critical value at the 90% confidence level is 12.66.   21 
 
Optimal Resource Use  
There are numerous studies in the economics literature concerned with the 
optimal use of natural resources under uncertainty.  Many of these assume that resource 
prices (or net benefits) evolve according to an exogenous stochastic process and then use 
stochastic dynamic optimization techniques to derive an optimal decision rule.  Among 
these studies is a large group of analyses of the optimal timber rotation decision (e.g., 
Norstrom, 1975; Brazee and Mendelsohn, 1988; Morck et al., 1989, Clarke and Reed, 
1989; Haight and Holmes, 1991; Lohmander, 1992; Thomson, 1992; Reed, 1993; 
Plantinga, 1998).  The central finding of rotation analyses is that the optimal harvesting 
rule involves a reservation price strategy:  harvest if the current price is above the 
reservation price and, otherwise, delay the harvest and reconsider the decision in the next 
period.  The reservation price strategy is shown to produce higher expected returns than 
the Faustmann rotation computed at the expected value of future prices.
11 
A second group of studies consider the decision to develop a parcel of land when 
the future net benefits from preservation are uncertain (e.g., Arrow and Fisher, 1974; 
Fisher and Hanemann, 1986; Albers, 1996).  In the current period, the future benefits of 
preservation are assumed to be unknown but distributed according to a known  
probability distribution.  In a later period, the uncertainty is resolved and the benefits of 
preservation are revealed.  The key result from these studies is that the expected net 
benefits from preservation are higher when uncertainty and the irreversibility of the 
                                                            
11 When prices are stationary, the reservation price strategy always does at least as well as the Faustmann 
rotation.  When prices are non-stationary (and serially uncorrelated), there are potential gains from a 
reservation price strategy only when fixed costs are present, such as timber management costs or alternative 
land uses.    22 
development decision are taken into account.  The option value (in the early literature, the 
quasi-option value) is computed as the difference between the ex ante value of the land 
when uncertainty and irreversibility are incorporated into the decision calculus and the ex 
ante value when uncertainty and irreversibility are ignored.
12 
  The basic message of optimal timber harvesting and option value studies is that 
resource managers can take advantage of information embodied in stochastic variations 
in prices or net benefits.  Our results make clear that no such opportunities exist in a 
rational expectations world.  In this case, market participants incorporate all relevant 
information about the structure of the market into their decision calculus.  The optimal 
behavior of resource managers produces efficient prices and, by definition, there is no 
room for improving on the solution.  Williams and Wright (1991) reinforce this point in 
the context of storage models: 
 
Lest there be some confusion, a finding that actual land prices, commodity 
prices, or the S&P stock index for that matter, do not behave as non-
stationary random walks does not imply that opportunities exist to profit 
from predictable price movements. … The land prices in the storage 
model are rational and offer no opportunity for assured speculation. 
 
Similarly, no opportunities exist to exploit serial correlation in resource prices if these 
prices are generated in an efficient market. 
  Our analysis draws attention to the fact that the timber harvesting and option 
value studies involve a comparison between two suboptimal decision rules.  These 
                                                            
12 As discussed by Fisher and Hanemann (1990), the first value is derived from a closed-loop control policy 
whereas the second is from an open-loop control policy.  Dixit and Pindyck (1994) analyze option values in 
the context of irreversible investment decisions.  In their terminology, the option value is the difference 
between the expected value of the investment obtained as the solution to a stochastic dynamic 
programming problem and the expected value derived from a simple net present value rule.  Lastly, 
Plantinga (1998) shows that the reservation price strategy in forestry studies is a mechanism for 
incorporating option values into the timber rotation decision.   23 
studies show that resource managers can increase expected profits by recognizing 
uncertainty and irreversibility.  However, the assumption that prices or net benefits 
evolve according to an exogenous stochastic process necessarily means that information 
about the structure of resource markets is ignored.  Accordingly, the derived decision rule 
cannot be optimal.  Our results suggest a general problem with applying decision rules 
based on exogenous price specifications to goods that involve physical stocks (e.g., 
renewable resources, agricultural commodities, land resources).  Due to stock-outs and, 
in some cases, age-dependent growth, prices for these goods are likely to be stationary 
and serially correlated.  A decision rule based on an assumption of exogenous stationary 
and serially correlated prices is internally inconsistent, and widespread adoption of the 
rule would alter the underlying structural environment and the form of the stochastic 
price process.  Decision rules based on alternative prices specifications (e.g., geometric 
Brownian motion) are apt to lead to bad decisions. 
In using exogenous prices to develop prescriptive policies for dynamic resource 
use, from harvesting trees to catching fish, the analyst embraces a tenuous proposition: 
that the particular price process used to develop the policy is “close enough” to the true, 
endogenous process to render the analysis meaningful.  “Close enough” depends on the 
audience for the prescription.  In this prescriptive literature, then, the analyst believes he 
has chosen an exogenous price process closer to the true process than that chosen by his 
audience.  So, for instance, the option value literature is aimed at decision-makers who 
fail to consider in their decision-making the stochastic elements of the decision 
environment.  But, as we have shown, the prescription is not necessarily the best 
medicine, and so the burden falls to the analyst to carefully rationalize a particular   24 
exogenous specification of endogenous variables like price.  Consider, for instance, 
studies that model timber prices as (nonstationary) random walks (e.g., Morck et al., 
1989; Clarke and Reed, 1989; Thomson, 1992; Reed, 1993).  This price specification is 
often justified by the claim that it is consistent with market efficiency.  But the previous 
analysis disputes this claim: an efficient timber market may generate stationary prices.  In 
the future, alternative rationales must accompany the use of random walk processes such 
as Brownian motion in stochastic models of resource use.       
 
Time-Series Analysis 
  A number of studies have examined the relationship between reservation price 
strategies, market efficiency, and results of time-series analyses of timber prices.  
Washburn and Binkley (1990) argue that the reservation price strategies in timber 
harvesting studies exploit predictable departures from an equilibrium price level and, 
therefore, rely on an implicit assumption of market inefficiency.  To investigate if timber 
markets are efficient, Washburn and Binkley (W&B) conduct tests of “weak-form” 
market efficiency (Fama 1970) using time-series data on southern pine timber prices.
13  
W&B test whether ex post deviations of actual rates of price change from equilibrium 
rates are white noise.  Some evidence of weak-form efficiency in timber markets is 
found:  deviations are serially independent for annual and quarterly time series, but 
serially correlated for monthly time series.  This finding suggests that the current price is 
the best predictor of price a quarter or more in the future.  In the nearer term, additional 
information may be contained in the past sequence of prices.   25 
  A number of follow-up studies to W&B have produced different results.  Haight 
and Holmes (1991) find evidence of stationarity in time-series of quarterly opening 
southern pine series. The annual and quarterly series analyzed by W&B are averaged 
prices, and Haight and Holmes demonstrate that a series of averaged prices tend to 
behave as a non-stationary random walk even when the underlying price series is 
stationary and autoregressive.  Similarly, Yin and Newman (1995) find evidence of price 
stationarity in fourteen southern pine sawtimber markets.  In a comment on W&B, 
Hultkrantz (1993) shows that, while the W&B results fail to reject the null hypothesis 
that quarterly and annual prices are non-stationary, they also fail to reject stationarity.  To 
gain greater precision on the estimates, Hultkrantz re-estimates the model with pooled 
data and finds that non-stationarity can be rejected.  However, in a response to Hultkrantz 
(1993), Washburn and Binkley (1993) question the appropriateness of the pooling 
strategy, citing evidence of distinct markets in different regions. 
  In our judgment, the weight of the evidence suggests that timber prices are 
stationary.  What does this result indicate about market efficiency and the effectiveness of 
a reservation price strategy?  Our results indicate that price stationarity has little bearing 
on these issues.  We show that stationary and serially correlated prices can be generated 
in a rational expectations equilibrium in which all agents are optimizing.  Of course, an 
informationally inefficient market can produce stationary prices as well.  Thus, a finding 
of stationarity does not clarify the issue of market efficiency.  Moreover, we demonstrate 
that stationarity is not a sufficient condition for the efficacy of a reservation price 
strategy.  In our model, optimizing agents cannot use the stationarity of prices to their 
                                                                                                                                                                             
13 As stated in W&B, a timber market is weak-form efficient if “the current price of sawtimber stumpage 
incorporates all of the information obtainable by studying past departures from equilibrium rates of price   26 
further advantage—stationary prices are the endogenous result of optimizing agents.  
  Our results contradict views commonly expressed in the literature.  Hultkrantz 
(1993) states that W&B’s conclusion regarding reservation price strategies—“that ‘there 
can be no can gain from using past price movements to play the market in timing timber 
harvests’”—“follows if timber prices are non-stationary.”  In other words, the claim is 
that price non-stationarity is a necessary condition for the ineffectiveness of a reservation 
price strategy.  We show that a reservation price strategy can be ineffective when prices 
are stationary, in the sense that it represents a second-best decision rule.  Timber 
managers using reservation price strategies are using past prices to forecast future prices; 
such adaptive price expectations are by definition inferior to rational expectations.  As 
stated above, whether a reservation price strategy is “close enough” depends on both the 
alternative harvest policy (such as the Faustmann rule), and the true process generating 
prices.  This is an empirical issue requiring additional research.   
 
Optimal Storage 
  Our theoretical model generalizes earlier models of optimal commodity storage 
(Samuelson, 1971; Scheinkman and Schechtman, 1983; Williams and Wright 1991, 
Deaton and Laroque 1992, 1996).  In Williams and Wright, for example, the condition for 
a competitive equilibrium with storage is, 
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change.”   27 
where k is the unit cost of storage, ω  is the rate of depreciation in the inventory, and  t S  is 
aggregate storage (Williams and Wright, Equations 2.5 and 4.3).  The price relations in 
(11) reduce to (17) when the growth rate of the inventory is constant and storage costs are 
assumed to be zero.  Note that in the commodity storage case, “appropriately deflated” 
prices follow a martingale process if stock-outs do not occur (i.e., if St  is always 
positive). 
In our model of the timber market, we evaluate the case in which stock-outs do 
not take place.  There are at least two reasons why the absence of stock-outs is plausible 
in the case of renewable resources.  First, the growth rate of renewable resources 
increases as the inventory, or the age of constituent elements of the inventory, falls.  High 
growth rates increase the incentive for managers to hold stocks for the future and, thus, 
act as a barrier against total depletion of the inventory.  Second, in the case of some 
renewable resources (e.g., forests), landowners hold stocks for reasons other than 
commodity production (e.g., private recreational benefits).  Under typical demand 
conditions, prices may not be high enough to induce supply.  However, when prices are 
high enough to compensate these owners for foregone non-commodity benefits, they may 
supply to the market and, thus, stock-outs are averted.  In this paper, we demonstrate that 
the absence of stock-outs does not eliminate serial price correlation, as in the commodity 
storage case, and that the key to this result is stock-dependent growth of the inventory.   
 
V.  Conclusions 
For several decades, economists have worked to extend deterministic models of 
optimal resource use (e.g., Clark, 1976) to account for the uncertainty inherent in   28 
biological and economic processes.  In particular, there have many efforts to apply the 
theory on real options to the optimal management of renewable resources.  Options 
theory is concerned with optimal investment decisions in a dynamic and uncertain 
environment and, thus, seems a natural fit to problems of optimal resource use.  
Moreover, elegant and tractable analytical models of investment have been developed for 
the case in which uncertainty can be represented as geometric Brownian motion (e.g., 
Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).  The main conclusion of this paper is that researchers need to 
think carefully about the structural features of the market they are analyzing before 
choosing to model endogenous market variables as exogenous stochastic processes.  In 
the case of renewable resources, modeling prices as an exogenous stochastic process 
leads to decision rules that are either inconsisent with market equilibrium or simply 
wrong.  
The issues examined in this paper have many parallels to the finance literature.  In 
particular, there is the enduring question of whether stock investors can profit from 
information gleaned from analyses of past prices.  Traditionally, economists has 
dismissed such practices on theoretical grounds, arguing that in an efficient market all 
relevant information about a stock’s price in the future will be embodied in the current 
price (e.g., Malkiel, 1981).  However, the efficient market hypothesis has come under 
attack in recent years as the result of emerging empirical evidence of the predictability of 
stock returns from past returns (e.g., Brock et al., 1992).  The analogue to the renewable 
resource case is the development of an appropriate test of market efficiency applied to 
historical data on renewable resource prices.  Such a test would need to recognize that an 
efficient market for renewable resources can generate stationary and serially correlated   29 
prices.  Another avenue for future research is the examination of how well decision rules 
based on past prices perform in a rational expectations environment and how widespread 
adoption of such rules alter the underlying market structure.   30 
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Table 1.  Parameter values used in simulation 
 
Parameter Value 
g1  1.0, 1.2 
g2 1.0,  1.1 
g3 1.0 
c0  10.0 
c1  2.0 
δ   .95
a 
 
a Other values of the discount factor were examined; see text and Table 2.   34 




Value of β   Frequency of stockouts (%)  Estimate of d1 (standard 
error in parentheses) 
.99 0  .51  (.0086) 
.96 0  .32  (.0095) 
.95 0  .28  (.0096) 
.94 0  .25  (.0096) 
.90 0  .23  (.0097) 
.88 0  .26  (.0096) 
.87 .017  .29  (.0096) 
.86 .46  .37  (.0093) 
.85 3.92  .44  (.0089) 
.83 19.99  .51  (.0086) 
.80 51.99  .27  (.0096) 
.50  100  -0.02 (.010)  
 
a In all cases save two, the simulation was run for 10
4 years.  The exceptions were 
δ =.87, .88, where the search for the possibility of stockouts at very low frequency 
required a longer time series.          35 
Appendix.  Simulation Algorithm. 
  The simulation proceeds in two steps.  In the first, the equilibrium price function 
is approximated.  In the second, this approximation is used with initial state vector st, the 
state equations (12), and random draws from the disturbance function to generate an 
extended sequence of prices (10
4 to 10
6 periods).  Here we discuss the derivation of the 
equilibrium price function.   



















































where  jt γ  is the Lagrange multiplier for the nonnegativity constraint on class j, and  jt µ  





















































































With this in mind, the algorithm involves the following steps:  















 is approximated from the previous 
iteration (initially these functions are identically equal to zero) and for each grid 
point in the state space a search across harvest volumes is made to find the harvest   36 
decision 
e q  satisfying the four necessary conditions.  This search exploits the 
structure of the problem; namely, that because the rate of growth of timber 
declines with age (time since last harvest), harvest must proceed monotonically 
from stock class four to class one.  So long as some, but not all, timber is 
harvested, the solution is characterized by the result that  
 























for that stock level j for which the acreage harvested is an interior solution or a 
degenerate corner solution.  Otherwise the equilibrium price is found from the 
demand function with all stock consumed.  The solution is thus quickly bracketed 
within a stock class, and quasi-Newton methods are then used to find the solution 
to (A3).       
 
2.  Given the solution of the problem at the state grid points, the values of 
e
jt γ  are 







.  Taking the 
expectation of these values over the disturbance term yields new approximations 











 at the grid points.  To these values a 10
th-order 
Chebychev polynomial is fit (note, then, that the grid points are the Chebychev   37 
nodes).  This generates three-dimensional polynomial approximations to each of 











, j=2,3,4.         
 
3.  The algorithm returns to step 1 with these new approximations.  The algorithm 
terminates when the new approximations of equilibrium prices in (A3) are “close 
enough” to the old approximations.
14   
                                                            
14 At each grid point, prices are within .01 of their values in the previous iteration.   38 
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Figure 2.  Carryover and Prices for the Non-Constant Growth Scenario 
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